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ABSTRACT 
This paper conducts a welfare analysis of a two-part tariff that is applied to the congestion 
pricing of inputs supplied by a natural monopolist to competitive firms.  Firms in a competitive 
market are assumed to require an input in a fixed proportion to output, and a monopolist with 
increasing returns to scale technology is assumed to provide the input under a capacity constraint 
on  its  facility.    Congestion  pricing  of  inputs  achieves  allocative  efficiency  by  valuing  the 
constrained capacity of the monopolist in accordance with market conditions.  This pricing is 
optimal for both the welfare-maximizing regulator and the profit-maximizing monopolist if it is 
applied in the form of a uniform price for the input.  However, a two-part tariff for the congestion 
pricing of inputs is optimal if competition in the downstream market is imperfect or if there is 
demand uncertainty in the market. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In an industry in which naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related, the 
issue of how to regulate the prices of competitive firms’ access to the facility of a monopolist is a 
central question in debates on regulatory reform.  Access to the facility in the upstream sector is 
an input that is required by competitive firms to produce output in the downstream sector.  Thus, 
price regulation of access to the monopolist’s facility affects competition in the downstream 
market. 
An  extensive  literature  explores  the  issue  of  regulating  the  price  of  access  to 
monopolists’  facilities  (Einhorn,  1990;  Baumol  and  Sidak,  1994;  Laffont  and  Tirole,  1994; 
Vickers, 1995; Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers, 1996; Larson and Lehman, 1997; Armstrong, 
1998; Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a, 1998b; Leautier, 2000).  This literature typically applies 
access price regulation to network industries in which an input is required in a fixed proportion to 
output;  examples  include  telecommunications,  electricity,  gas  and  railways.    However,  the 
existing literature assumes that the capacity of the facility of the natural monopolist never fails to 
meet  the  demand  for  access.    Because  the  construction  of  the  natural  monopolist’s  facility 
requires substantial investment and a great deal of time, insufficient capacity in the facility may 
ration demand for access from downstream firms, and thereby discourage competition in the 
downstream market. 
This  paper  focuses  on  the  issue  of  access  price  regulation  in  vertically  related 
markets in which the demand for access may exceed the capacity of the natural monopolist’s 
facility.  Under the assumption that congestion pricing is applied to the usage of the facility as an 
allocatively efficient way of rationing, this paper examines whether a two-part tariff is desirable 
in terms of welfare maximization and profit maximization.  When congestion pricing is applied to 
the usage of a congestible facility owned and operated by a monopolist with increasing returns to 
scale technology, the issue of whether the monopolist is allowed to apply a two-part tariff to 
access pricing is particularly important.  This is because additional revenue from the fixed access   2
charge is necessary to finance capacity expansion if the revenue from congestion pricing does not 
meet the cost of capacity expansion.  Since a monopolist with constant returns to scale technology 
earns sufficient revenue from congestion pricing to cover the cost of capacity expansion (Mohring 
and Harwitz, 1962), monopolists have an incentive to expand congestible facilities (Vickrey, 
1971;  FERC,  1989,  pp.  96–97).    However,  a  monopolist  with  increasing  returns  to  scale 
technology requires an additional source of revenue to finance capacity expansion. 
Based on the idea that capacity expansion is financed by a combination of the 
revenue  from  congestion  pricing  and  the  fixed  access  fee,  Vogelsang  (2001)  investigates 
price-cap regulation of access to congestible transmission facilities that exhibit increasing returns 
to scale.  Vogelsang can be criticized for applying a two-part tariff to access pricing, which may be 
less desirable than a uniform price.  Indeed, Ordover and Panzar (1982, Proposition 5) prove that 
a two-part tariff is inferior to a uniform price in terms of both welfare and profits when the inputs 
purchased by downstream firms from a monopolist with increasing returns to scale are required in 
a fixed proportion to those firms’ outputs. 
The paper examines how three types of downstream-market environment affect the 
desirability of a two-part tariff for an input supplied by the congestible facility of an upstream 
monopolist.  First, it is assumed that the downstream market is perfectly competitive and the 
demand for the final product is known with certainty.  Hence, a proposition of Ordover and Panzar 
(1982)  relating  to  inputs  required  in  a  fixed  proportion  to  output  applies  in  the  context  of 
congestion pricing.  That is, a two-part tariff is inferior to a uniform price in terms of both welfare 
maximization and profit maximization.  Second, the assumption of perfect competition in the 
downstream  market  is  replaced  by  that  of  Cournot  competition,  under  which  each 
profit-maximizing firm with increasing returns to scale technology determines its output given 
the outputs of rival firms.  Contrary to the result of Ordover and Panzar, a two-part tariff, which 
combines a uniform congestion price with a fixed access fee, is superior to a uniform price of 
congestion under imperfect competition.  A two-part tariff is also better than a uniform price when   3
demand for the final product is uncertain, unless the objective of the regulator is to maximize 
social  welfare  without  limiting  the  profits  of  the  upstream  monopolist  or  unless  capacity 
constraints are always binding. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a basic model that assumes 
perfect competition in the downstream market and no uncertainty in the demand for the final 
product.    A  model  with  imperfect  competition is  analyzed  in  Section 3,  and  a  model  with 
uncertain demand is investigated in Section 4.  Section 5 presents brief conclusions and some 
policy  implications.    The  Appendix  provides  detailed  comparative  statics  and  a  numerical 
example. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
2.1 The Basic Model 
Consider an industry in which n identical firms purchase x units of an input in the upstream 
market to supply y units of a homogeneous product to consumers in the downstream market.  The 
input is essential in the sense that downstream firms cannot produce output without this input.  
Examples of this input include access to networks such as electricity and gas distribution, local 
telecommunications and railway tracks.  Without access to these networks, firms cannot compete 
effectively  in  downstream  markets  such  as  electricity  generation,  gas  supply,  long-distance 
telecommunications and train services.  The input is supplied by the monopolized upstream sector, 
and  the  final  product  is  supplied  by  the perfectly  competitive  downstream  sector,  which is 
characterized by the free entry and exit of identical firms operating at the minimum point of a 
U-shaped average cost curve.  The assumption of a U-shaped average cost curve implies that 
downstream production technology exhibits scale economies if firms operate below the output 
level  associated  with  the  minimum  average  cost.    Integer  constraints  are ignored,  and  n  is 
determined by the condition that downstream firms earn zero profits.  The purchased input is 
required in a fixed proportion to the output of the downstream firms; i.e., x = zy, where z is a   4
strictly positive constant representing the ratio of the input to the output.  This assumption holds 
in network industries in which access to networks mirrors service levels in the downstream sector 
and in which downstream firms must use a monopolist’s upstream network to supply services. 
Congestion occurs when total demand for the input, denoted by X, exceeds the 
capacity of the facility owned and operated by the upstream monopolist.  Networks such as 
electricity and gas distribution, local telecommunications and railway tracks may be congestible 
if the demand for access to these networks exceeds their capacity.  To efficiently ration the excess 
demand for the input, congestion pricing is applied in the upstream sector.  Given congestion, 
profit-maximizing downstream firms should pay r per unit of the input, or should pay zr per unit 
of the output.  Since the downstream sector is perfectly competitive, in equilibrium, the price of 
the final product, denoted by p, should be equal to the sum of zr and the marginal production cost.  
The second-order condition for profit maximization of the downstream firms is assumed to hold; 
that is, the marginal cost of production is an increasing function of output.  Using congestion 
pricing to achieve rationing is allocatively efficient because, in equilibrium, consumers who are 
only willing to pay less than p are rationed, as are downstream firms that have a marginal 
production cost exceeding (p − zr).  The unit price of congestion is endogenously determined by 
the degree to which the capacity constraint is tightened in the input market; that is, r > 0 if the 
capacity constraint on the congestible facility is binding, and r = 0 otherwise.  Unlike in the 
literature on peak-load pricing, no fluctuations in the demand for the input are assumed.  Section 4 
relaxes this assumption by incorporating stochastic fluctuations in input demand. 
Using a congestible facility, the upstream monopolist produces the required input 
under increasing returns to scale technology, which implies that the upstream sector is a natural 
monopoly.  Total costs in the upstream activity, denoted by Cm, are assumed to be a function of the 
capacity of the congestible facility that is used to produce the input: 
 
Cm = m0 + mK  (1)   5
 
where K denotes the capacity of the facility owned and operated by the upstream monopolist.  The 
parameters m0 and m are a fixed cost and the constant marginal cost of the upstream activity, 
respectively, and both are assumed to be strictly positive.  To focus on the effects of congestion 
pricing on competition in the downstream sector, the cost of operating the facility is assumed to be 
zero and costs in the upstream sector depend only on the capacity of the facility. 
The upstream monopolist can charge downstream firms a simple two-part tariff, 
comprising a fixed non-negative access fee, e, and a unit price, r, which corresponds to the unit 
price of congestion.  The total revenue of the upstream monopolist is the sum of en and rX.  The 
welfare-maximizing regulator or the profit-maximizing upstream monopolist chooses the optimal 
values  of  e  and  K,  while  the  value  of  r  is  determined  by  the  input  market.    Examples  of 
mechanisms that determine the value of r include an electricity market in Norway where the unit 
price of congestion is defined as an interregional difference in market clearing prices (Bjorndal 
and Jornsten, 2001).  A sealed-bid auction is another example of a mechanism determining the 
unit price of congestion for airport time slots (Rassenti, Smith and Bulfin, 1982). 
Equilibrium  in  the  final  product  market  is  determined  by  three  conditions:  (i) 
downstream firms earn zero profits; (ii) there is no excess demand for the final product; and (iii) 
the capacity constraint on the facility of the upstream monopolist is binding.  These conditions are 
represented by the following equations, respectively:  
 
         (p − zr)y(p, r) − Cd[y(p, r)]  = e  (2) 
n y(p, r) − D(p)  = 0  (3) 
and 
zD(p) = K,  (4) 
 
where y(p, r) is the supply function of each downstream firm, Cd(y) is the cost function of each   6
downstream firm, and D(p) is the demand curve for the final product.  All these functions are 
assumed to be twice differentiable.  It is also assumed that yp ￿ (￿y/￿p) > 0, yr ￿ (￿y/￿r) < 0, yr = 
−zyp, ￿Cd/￿y > 0, ￿
2Cd/￿y
2 > 0, and D’ ￿ ￿D/￿p < 0.  The first three follow from the standard 
properties of competitive firms’ profit functions.  Total demand for the final product depends only 
on price; income is ignored.  Equation (4) holds because X = nx = zny = zD(p) in equilibrium.  
Note that if the capacity constraint is not binding, condition (4) is irrelevant to the final product 
market and equilibrium is determined by only (2) and (3).  Ordover and Panzar (1982) assume 
that there is no binding constraint on capacity. 
 
              [Table 1 here] 
 
Comparative-static  analysis  is  conducted  to  investigate  the  response  of  the 
equilibrium values of p, r, n, y and X to changes in the parameters e and K.  The comparative-static 
results are summarized in Table 1, and the derivation of the partial derivatives in Table 1 is 
described in Appendix A.  When capacity is held constant, an increase in the access fee reduces 
the congestion price.  This is because the number of downstream firms falls following a rise in the 
access fee.  A decrease in total output due to a fall in the number of downstream firms following a 
rise in the access fee is exactly offset by the increase in total output that is due to an increase in the 
output of each downstream firm.  Thus, total demand for the input, X, which is assumed to equal 
zny, is not affected by a change in the access fee.  Holding the access fee constant, an increase in 
capacity lowers both the congestion price per unit of output and the final product price by the 
same amount.  Hence, the output of each downstream firm is unaffected.  The equilibrium number 
of firms increases by 1/x due to the expansion of capacity by one unit.  The increase in capacity by 
one unit results in a one-unit increase in total demand for the input. 
 
   7
2.2 Welfare Analysis 
Based on the comparative-static analysis given in Section 2.1, optimal choices of input two-part 
tariffs are investigated in the context of different objective functions.  The welfare measure is 
defined as a weighted sum of upstream monopoly profits and the consumer surplus: 
 
          ) )( 1 ( ) ( 0 m mK en rX dw w D L
p - - + - + = ￿ g g   (5)  
 
where ￿ and 1 – ￿ are the weights on the consumer surplus and monopoly profits, respectively.  
This formulation makes it possible to consistently analyze the maximization of monopoly profits 
(￿ = 0), Ramsey-type constrained welfare optima (0 < ￿ < 0.5), and unconstrained welfare 
maximization (￿ = 0.5).  Note that, by assumption, since downstream firms earn zero profits, their 
profits are excluded from the right-hand side of (5). 
Assuming a non-negative access fee and available upstream capacity, the results in 
Table 1 yield the following necessary conditions for an optimum: 
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where ￿ ￿ (1−2￿)/(1−￿).  The welfare effects of the access fee comprise changes in the both the 
consumer surplus and upstream monopoly profits.  The term associated with the effect of the 
access fee on the consumer surplus is absent from ￿L/￿e because the access fee does not affect the 
price of the final product given a constant amount of capacity.  Thus, the welfare effects of the 
access fee are limited to effects on upstream monopoly profits.  This effect is given by e(￿n/￿e),   8
which is equal to e(nyr)/(zy
2) < 0.  Thus, the access fee reduces welfare.  From (6), the optimal 
access fee is obtained. 
 
PROPOSITION 1.  When there is a perfectly competitive downstream sector and no 
demand uncertainty for the final product, the optimal access fee is zero. 
 
PROOF.  Since (1 − ￿)(nyr)/(zy
2) < 0 in ￿L/￿e, only e = 0 satisfies the necessary 
condition, e(￿L/￿e) = 0 in (6).  Q.E.D. 
 
This result is also obtained by Ordover and Panzar (1982, Proposition 5) in the 
context of production technology with fixed proportions of x and y.  As indicated by Ordover and 
Panzar, if the downstream sector is perfectly competitive and the input is required in a fixed 
proportion to output, the upstream monopolist could maximize profits simply by inducing the 
optimal level of r by an appropriate choice of capacity, but could gain nothing from applying a 
two-part tariff.  The well-known Coasian results, that the unit price equals marginal cost (r = m) 
and that profits are extracted via the access fee (e > 0), do not apply if the perfectly competitive 
production technology of downstream firms combines inputs and outputs in fixed proportions. 
The necessary condition with respect to K in (7) implies that the congestion price 
should reflect the marginal capacity cost of the facility.  Since r = m for ￿ = 0.5, unconstrained 
welfare maximization requires the lowest congestion price and the maximum capacity of the 
upstream  facility.    By  contrast,  the  maximization  of  monopoly  profit  requires  the  highest 
congestion price and the minimum capacity of the upstream facility.  Given the maximization of 
monopoly profit, the difference between the unit congestion price and the marginal capacity cost 
relative to the final product price is equal to the product of 1/z and the inverse of the price 
elasticity of the final product: (r − m)/p = 1/(z￿), where ￿ ￿ −pD’/D. 
    9
3. IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN THE DOWNSTREAM MARKET 
In  liberalized  markets,  the  introduction  of  competition  is expected to lower product  prices, 
thereby  raising  allocative  efficiency.    However,  liberalized  markets  are  not  necessarily  as 
competitive as might be expected.  Examples include the electricity supply industry in some 
European  countries  and  the  United  States,  where  there  has  been  a  growing  concern  about 
inefficiency due to the market power of some generators who use constrained transmission 
facilities (Green and Newbery, 1992; Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999).  Examples also include the 
airline industry in the United States, where carriers with access to highly congested airports have 
market power (Brueckner, 2002). 
In this section, the assumption that the downstream market is perfectly competitive is 
replaced by the assumption that there is Cournot competition in the downstream market.  In the 
Cournot equilibrium, no downstream firm has any incentive to alter its behavior given the output 
decisions of its rivals.  If downstream firms exhibit Cournot behavior, there will be a mark-up on 
the price of the final product.  As suggested by Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994, p. 151), 
lowering the unit price of the input below its marginal cost may effectively offset the mark-up.  In 
turn, an access fee may be charged to cover upstream expenses. 
 
3.1 The Model with Cournot Competition in the Downstream Market 
The downstream firms are assumed to operate at the Cournot equilibrium.  As in Section 2, 
integer constraints are ignored, and n is determined by the condition that each downstream firm 
earns zero profits.  Given the Cournot behavior of the downstream firms, the equilibrium price of 
the final product exceeds the sum of the congestion payment per unit of output (zr) and the 
marginal production cost (￿Cd/￿y) by the amount y/(−D’).  This mark-up reflects the market 
power of downstream firms.  The second-order condition in the Cournot oligopoly is assumed to 
hold; i.e., z/D’+y/D’’ < ￿
2Cd/￿y
2.  Note that unless D’ is independent of the final product price, the 
equality yr = −zyp does not necessarily hold in Cournot competition.   10
In the Cournot equilibrium, conditions (2), (3) and (4) also hold as in the perfect 
competition case.  However, the responses of the Cournot equilibrium values of p, r, n, y and X to 
changes in the parameters e and K differ from those in the perfect-competition equilibrium unless 
D’ is independent of the final product price.  The comparative-static results in the Cournot 
equilibrium are summarized in Table 2, and the derivation of the partial derivatives in Table 2 is 
described in Appendix B.  If D’ is independent of the final product price, which is the case in a 
linear  demand  function,  the  equality  yr =  −zyp  holds.    Hence,  the  response  of  the  Cournot 
equilibrium values of p, r, n, y and X to a change in the parameter K is the same as that under 
perfect competition. 
 
              [Table 2 here] 
 
Compared with the perfect competition case, the responses of the congestion price, 
the supply by downstream firms and the number of downstream firms to a change in the access 
fee when capacity is constant are mitigated by the positive term D’/[D’+(yr/z)], which is less than 
unity, in the Cournot equilibrium.  This is because, in the Cournot equilibrium, the shift in the 
total supply curve in the downstream market due to a change in the access fee is smaller than the 
shift that occurs in the perfect-competition equilibrium.  Holding the access fee constant, the 
effects  of  a  change  in  capacity  on  the  endogenous  variables  are  ambiguous  under  Cournot 
competition.  Whether capacity expansion raises firm supply depends on the relative sizes of yp 
and yr.  If zyp < −yr, the expansion of capacity raises firm supply.  The relative sizes of the terms 
zD’ + yr and n(zyp + yr) affect whether capacity expansion increases the number of firms.  If n(zyp 
+ yr) is larger (smaller) than zD’ + yr, the expansion of capacity raises (lowers) the number of 
downstream firms.  The number of firms is not affected by the capacity of the upstream facility if 
zD’ + yr is equal to n(zyp + yr). 
   11 
3.2 Welfare Analysis in Cournot Competition 
Using the results in Table 2 of Section 3.1, the optimal input two-part tariffs faced by Cournot 
oligopolists are investigated under welfare maximization in (5).  The necessary condition with 
respect to the parameter e is: 
 




















r g .  (8) 
 
As in the case of perfect competition, there is no effect of the access fee on the consumer surplus 
because ￿p/￿e = 0 in Cournot competition.  Although in both cases the term e(￿n/￿e), which is 
non-positive, appears on the right-hand side of the necessary condition with respect to e, there is 
an additional effect of the access fee on upstream profits under Cournot competition, which is 
given by the term n + ￿(rX)/￿e, which is positive in this case.  This positive effect, which does not 
arise in the case of perfect competition, is taken into account, as is the adverse effect of ￿n/￿e 
when the optimal two-part tariff is to be chosen in the case of imperfect competition in the 
downstream sector. 
The solution of (8) yields the following proposition on the optimal choice of input 
two-part tariff in the Cournot equilibrium: 
 
PROPOSITION 2.  If the downstream market is in the Cournot equilibrium, the 
optimal access fee is positive. 
 
PROOF.  Suppose that e = 0.  Then, from (8) and yr/(zD’+yr) > 0, ￿L/￿e > 0.  Thus, the 
necessary condition for an optimum, ￿L/￿e ￿ 0, cannot be satisfied if e = 0.  Suppose instead that 
e > 0.  Then, from (8), ￿L/￿e = 0.  Solving ￿L/￿e = 0 yields the optimal access fee, e = y
2/(−D’) > 
0.  Thus, the necessary condition for an optimum is satisfied only if e is positive.  Q.E.D.   12
 
The positive access fee at the optimum in the Cournot equilibrium contrasts with the 
optimal access fee of zero under perfect competition, as indicated by Proposition 1.  In the 
Cournot equilibrium, there is a mark-up on the final product price because downstream firms can 
directly affect the final product price by changing the levels of output.  This mark-up is given by 
the term y/(−D’), which corresponds to the difference between the final product price and the sum 
of congestion payments per unit of output and the marginal production cost. 
For the input tariff to be optimal in terms of either welfare maximization or profit 
maximization, the unit price of the input must fall to offset the distortion caused by the mark-up 
on the final product price.  A fall in the upstream monopolist’s revenue, which is due to the fall in 
the unit price of the input, must be offset by the access fee.  The access fee generates excess 
profits for the upstream monopolist, with these profits arising from Cournot competition in the 
downstream market. 
Note that the optimal access fee in the Cournot equilibrium can also be obtained from 
a  model  that  assumes:  (i)  that  both  r  and  e  are  parameters  to  be  chosen  by  either  a 
welfare-maximizing regulator or a profit-maximizing upstream monopolist; (ii) that the capacity 
constraint is not binding so that congestion pricing is irrelevant to the analysis; and (iii) that the 
upstream monopolist’s total cost depends only on the total demand for access to the upstream 
facility.  These assumptions render the model of this paper equivalent to that of Ordover and 
Panzar (1982), who only investigate the case of perfect competition with no demand uncertainty.  
This modified model with Cournot competition is described in Appendix C, which also presents a 
derivation of the optimal positive access fee. 
Using the results in Table 2, the necessary condition with respect to the parameter K 
under Cournot competition is: 
   13
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From (9), e = y
2/(−D’), and K=zny, the optimal price of congestion is: 
 








+ = .  (10) 
 
Equation (10) implies that for unconstrained welfare to be maximized (￿ = 0), the 
unit price of congestion must be lower than the marginal cost of capacity.  The unconstrained 
welfare-optimal two-part tariff in the case of Cournot competition (r < m, e > 0) differs from the 
unconstrained welfare-optimal solutions in the case of perfect competition (r = m, e = 0).  If there 
is more than one Cournot firm, the profit-maximizing upstream monopolist (￿ = 1) chooses a unit 
price of congestion that exceeds the marginal cost of capacity.  The difference between the unit 
congestion price and marginal cost of capacity relative to the final product price depends not only 
on the price elasticity of total demand, but also on the number of downstream firms; that is, 
(r − m)/p = (n − 1)/(z￿n). 
To illustrate how Cournot competition affects vertically related markets, consider the 
following example, in which the demand and marginal cost functions are linear.  Suppose that 
D(p) = a − p and that Cd(y) = c0 + 0.5by
2.  Each downstream firm is assumed to require one unit of 
the input to produce one unit of output, so z = 1.  Then, y(p, r) = (p − r)/(1 + b) and e = y
2 for 
Cournot competition.  For perfect competition, y(p, r) = (p − r)/b and e = 0.  From (2), the 
equilibrium supply of each Cournot firm is (2c0/b)
0.5, which is equal to the equilibrium supply of 
each competitive firm.  While the supply of each competitive firm corresponds to the minimum 
point  of  the  average  cost,  where  marginal  and  average  costs  are  equal,  each  Cournot  firm 
produces at an output level at which average costs are declining.  This is because the average cost 
of each downstream firm exceeds its marginal cost by e/y in the Cournot equilibrium.  The   14
optimal  access  fee  in  Cournot  competition  is  2c0/b  whether  there  is  unconstrained  welfare 
maximization, constrained welfare maximization or profit maximization. 
Compared to the case of perfect competition in which p = [a + m + (2bc0)
0.5]/2 and K 
= [a − m − (2bc0)
0.5]/2 in equilibrium, in Cournot competition, the final product price increases by 
(2c0/b)
0.5,  and  the  capacity  of  the  upstream  facility  is  reduced  by  (2c0/b)
0.5  under  profit 
maximization.  Under unconstrained welfare maximization, in equilibrium, the final product price 
is m + (2bc0)
0.5 and capacity is a − m − (2bc0)
0.5 both when there is perfect competition and when 
there is Cournot competition.  Compared to the case of perfect competition, when r = m in 
equilibrium, Cournot competition lowers the optimal price of congestion by (2c0/b)
0.5 under 
unconstrained  welfare  maximization    The  optimal  monopoly  price  of  congestion  is 
[a + m − (2bc0)
0.5]/2 regardless of whether there is perfect competition or Cournot competition. 
 
4. EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY IN DEMAND FOR THE FINAL PRODUCT 
The construction of an operational upstream facility that provides downstream firms with their 
essential input takes time.  Since the unit price of congestion depends on both upstream and 
downstream  market  conditions,  the  upstream  monopolist  who  chooses  the  capacity  of  the 
essential facility is uncertain about what revenue can be earned from congestion pricing.  This 
paper focuses on uncertainty that only affects demand for the final product.  Causes of uncertainty 
in final product demand include business cycles, population growth and a saturation of durable 
goods.    The  optimal  two-part  tariff  on  the  input  purchased  by  the  perfectly  competitive 
downstream firms is investigated when there is uncertainty in final product demand. 
 
4.1 The Model with Uncertainty in Demand for the Final Product 
The assumptions made in this section are the same as those made in Section 2 except in relation to 
demand for the final product.  The demand for the final product is now assumed to be a function 
of both price and the state of the world,  W Î w .  In addition, the demand function D(p, ￿) is   15
strictly downward sloping in p for all values of ￿.  The set of all states of the world, ￿, can be 
divided into two subsets according to the necessity for rationing: ￿0 = {￿| D(p, ￿) ￿ K}, which 
includes states in which no rationing occurs, and ￿1 = {￿| D(p, ￿) > K}, which includes states in 
which there is rationing.  For congestion pricing to be effective, the probability that rationing 
occurs is assumed to be positive.  The variable ￿ is assumed to be a continuous random variable 
with a compact range. 
The response of the endogenous variables to changes in the access fee and capacity 
depends on the subset of states to which the world belongs.  While the final product price and firm 
supplies are stochastic variables that depend on ￿, the number of firms is not stochastic and n 
does  not  depend  on  ￿.    In  the  states  in  which  the  capacity  constraint  is  binding,  the 
comparative-static results from Table 1 apply.  In the states in which the capacity constraint of the 
essential facility is not binding, the unit price of congestion is zero and the revenue of the 
upstream monopolist depends only on the access fee.  When there is no rationing, the equilibrium 
is determined by two conditions: that the downstream firms earn zero profits and that there is no 
excess demand for the final product.  Thus, the equilibrium condition (4) is irrelevant for the 
comparative statics in states belonging to the subset ￿0.  The results of the comparative-static 
analysis for the perfect-competition equilibrium for ￿0 are summarized in Table 3, and the 
derivation of the partial derivatives in Table 3 is described in Appendix D. 
 
                [Table 3 here] 
 
Unlike in the case of states in which the capacity constraint is binding, for ￿0, an 
increase in the access fee raises the final product price in equilibrium, and thereby reduces the 
consumer surplus.  This is because the upward shift in the total supply curve of the downstream 
firms, which is due to this rise in the access fee, raises the final product price along the demand 
curve when the capacity constraint is not binding.  Although an increase in the access fee raises   16
the supply of each individual firm, this additional supply is more than offset by the decrease in 
total supply associated with the fall in the number of firms due to the increased access fee.  Thus, 
in equilibrium, total demand for the input falls following an increase in the access fee when the 
capacity constraint is not binding. 
 
4.2 Welfare Analysis under Demand Uncertainty 
Based on the comparative-static results in Tables 1 and 3, this section explores the features of the 
optimal two-part tariff paid by the competitive downstream firms when there is uncertainty about 
final product demand.  In Section 4.2, the expectation of the welfare function in (5) is maximized.  
The  expected  value  of  the  welfare  function  is  assumed  to  be  sufficiently  regular  for  the 
expectations and differentiation operators to be interchangeable (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1976, p. 
224).  The first-order condition for maximizing the expected value of the welfare function in (5) 
with respect to the access fee is: 
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where P0 is the probability that the capacity constraint is not binding, and  
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Unlike in the case when there is no demand uncertainty about the final product, the 
necessary condition in (11) includes an additional term, (1 − 2￿)nP0, which represents the welfare 
effect of the access fee when there is no binding constraint on the capacity of the facility.  Except 
in the case of unconstrained welfare optimization with ￿ = 0.5, this term arises unless the capacity   17
constraint  is  binding  in  all  states;  that  is,  P0 =  0.   Thus,  solving  (11)  yields  the  following 
proposition  about  the  optimal  two-part  tariff  when  there  is  uncertainty  about  final  product 
demand. 
 
PROPOSITION  3.    For  the  maximization  of  the  expected  value  of  constrained 
welfare or upstream monopoly profits in the perfectly competitive equilibrium when there is 
uncertainty about final product demand, the access fee must be zero if the capacity constraint is 
binding in all states, that is, if P0 = 0, and the access fee must be positive if P0 > 0.  For the 
maximization of the expected value of unconstrained welfare, the access fee must be zero for any 
value of P0. 
 
PROOF.  If P0 = 0 or ￿ = 0.5, the first term on the right-hand side of E(￿L/￿e) is zero 
in (11).  Then, e must be zero to satisfy the necessary condition, eE(￿L/￿e) = 0, at the optimum.  If 
P0 > 0 and ￿ < 0.5, the first term on the right-hand side of E(￿L/￿e) is positive.  Then, for E(￿L/￿e) 
to be non-positive, e must be positive at the optimum.  Q.E.D. 
 
The  intuition  behind  Proposition  3  is  straightforward.    Uncertainty  about  final 
product demand leads to the possibility that the capacity constraint is not binding and no revenue 
is earned from congestion pricing.  To cover this loss in revenue, the access fee must be positive if 
either the expected value of constrained welfare or expected upstream monopoly profits are being 
maximized.  However, for the maximization of the expected value of unconstrained welfare, there 
is no need to charge for access to the essential facility to offset the loss in revenue associated with 
a congestion price of zero.  For all objective functions in the case of perfect competition in the 
downstream sector, congestion pricing alone is sufficient and an access fee is not necessary if the 
capacity constraint is binding in all states of the world. 
The  positive  access  fee  associated  with  maximizing  the  expected  value  of   18
constrained welfare or monopoly profits when there is uncertain demand for the final product 
implies that a two-part tariff is superior to a uniform price of congestion for the input purchased 
by  the  competitive  downstream  firms.    The  two-part  tariff  is  particularly  desirable  when 
congestion pricing applies to usage of the facility that is significantly affected by uncertain 
demand.  This is because uncertainty results in frequent occurrences of a zero congestion price, 
which  discourages  the  upstream  monopolist  from  expanding  capacity.    For  the  upstream 
monopolist to have an incentive to expand capacity, the revenue from the access fee, which is 
based on the number of downstream firms and thereby unaffected by uncertainty in market 
conditions, should be used to cover the substantial investment costs of capacity installation. 
Note that uncertainty alone does not necessarily imply the superiority of the two-part 
tariff over a uniform price for maximizing the expected value of constrained welfare or monopoly 
profits.  A uniform congestion price is superior to a two-part tariff when there is uncertainty about 
demand for the final product if the capacity constraint is binding in all states of the world.  This is 
because the upstream monopolist can earn revenue from congestion pricing alone if P0 = 0. 
With respect to the capacity of the facility, the necessary condition for maximizing 
the expectation of the objective function in (5) under demand uncertainty is: 
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where  y  indicates the value of y for  W Î w 1.  Note that firm supply is identical for any state that 
belongs toW 1 because y = K/(zn) for W Î w 1.  The first term on the right-hand side of (13) 
represents the expectation of the marginal benefits of capacity installation.  For a positive value of 
K, the expected marginal benefits should be equal to the marginal cost of the facility.  For the 
maximization of the expected value of unconstrained welfare, the condition (13) simplifies to 
indicate that the expected value of the unit congestion price should be equal to the marginal   19
capacity  cost.    The  effects  of  uncertainty  on  vertically  related  markets  are  illustrated  by  a 
numerical example in Appendix E. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the optimal structure of a simple two-part tariff.  This tariff comprises an 
access fee and a unit price of congestion for an input supplied by an upstream monopolist from a 
congestible facility in vertically related markets.  Congestion pricing is an efficient form of 
rationing the demand from downstream firms for access to the essential facility of the upstream 
monopolist.  Assuming congestion pricing is applied to the upstream sector, the optimal access 
fee must be zero to maximize social welfare or monopoly profits if the downstream market is 
perfectly competitive.  However, if the downstream market engages in Cournot competition, a 
positive access fee is required to maximize welfare or monopoly profits.  A two-part tariff is also 
superior to a uniform price under constrained welfare maximization or the maximization of 
monopoly profits if there is uncertainty about demand for the final product and the probability of 
congestion is less than unity. 
Whether a two-part tariff is superior to a uniform price of access to the congestible 
facility depends on both the market structure of the downstream sector and whether there is 
uncertainty about final product demand.  Using a two-part tariff for congestion pricing in the 
upstream sector is not optimal if the downstream market is perfectly competitive and there is no 
uncertainty about final product demand.  This result implies that a two-part tariff scheme with a 
price-cap constraint, which is investigated by Vogelsang (2001), should be applied to industries in 
which either imperfect competition or demand uncertainty is dominant in the downstream sector. 
Examples  of  network  industries  in  which  a  two-part  tariff  on  the  input  with 
congestion pricing is appropriate include electricity supply and airlines.  In electricity supply, a 
type of congestion pricing known as ‘nodal pricing,’ which efficiently values electricity demand 
that depends on time and location, has been applied to a transmission market (Stoft, 2002, Part 5).    20
Imperfect competition features in a generation market that is vertically related to a transmission 
market (Green and Newbery, 1992; Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999).  Uncertain demand and 
imperfect competition also feature in transport industries such as airlines, in which congestion 
pricing is used to mitigate air-traffic delays and in which airlines with access to congested airports 
have market power (Brueckner, 2002).  If congestion pricing is applied to these industries, a fixed 
fee for access to networks is desirable in terms of constrained welfare maximization. 
 
 
APPENDIX A: Derivation of the Partial Derivatives in Table 1 
To see the response of the final product price to a change in the access fee, firstly 







.                                                                                                         (A1) 
 
Then,  totally  differentiating  (2),  and  substituting  (A1)  and  the  first-order  condition  for 
downstream profit maximization yields  
 






  .                                                                                                                (A2) 
 
Equations (A1) and (A2) lead to the response of firm supply to the access fee: 
 










 ,                                                                                                     (A3) 
 
where yp ￿ ￿y/￿p and yr ￿ ￿y/￿r.  Note that ￿y/￿r = −z(￿y/￿p) for perfectly competitive downstream   21
production if the purchased input is in fixed proportion to output, i.e., x=zy.  Finally, totally 
differentiating (3) and substituting (A1) and (A2) yields 
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        As for the response of the final product price to a change in the capacity of the essential 
facility, total differentiation of (4) yields 
 








   .                                                                                                            (A6) 
 
Then, totally differentiating (2) and substituting (A6) yield  
 








   ,                                                                                                         (A7) 
 
Equations (A6) and (A7) lead to the response of firm supply to a change in capacity: 
 





 .                                                                                                                    (A8) 
 
Finally, totally differentiating (3), and substituting (A6) and (A7) yields   22
 





  ,                                                                                                                      (A9) 
and 
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APPENDIX B: Derivation of the Partial Derivatives in Table 2 
In Cournot equilibrium, the response of equilibrium values of p and X is equal to 
that in perfect competition.  As for the effects of the access fee, totally differentiating (2) and 
substituting (A1) yields 
 



















   .                                                                                          (A11) 
  
Then, (A1) and (A11) lead to the response of firm supply to the access fee: 
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Finally, totally differentiating (3), and substituting (A1) and (A11) yields 
 





















 .                                                                                         (A13) 
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Turning to the effects of the capacity of the facility, totally differentiating (2) 
and substituting (A6) yields 
 













  .                                                                          (A14) 
  
Equations (A6) and (A14) lead to the response of Cournot firm supply to a change in capacity: 
 
              











  .                                                                                            (A15) 
 
Finally, totally differentiating (3), and substituting (A6) and (A14) yields 
 
 














  .                                                                            (A16) 
 
If D’ is independent of the final product price as in the case of a linear demand curve, zyp=−yr, the 
response of endogenous variables to a change in parameter K in Cournot equilibrium becomes the 
same as that in perfect competition equilibrium.    
 
 
APPENDIX C: Derivation of the Optimal Two-Part Tariff of the Input in Cournot Equilibrium by 
Applying the Model of Ordover and Panzar (1982)  
The model is as in the identical firm case with a fixed proportion between x and y 
(x=zy, z>0) investigated by Ordover and Panzar (1982), who assume that r and e are parameters   24
and p, n, and x are endogenous variables, except that the downstream market is described by 
Cournot competition.  Ordover and Panzar also assume that capacity never constrains the demand 
for the input, and parameter K and congestion pricing are irrelevant to the analysis.  Total cost of 
the upstream monopolist is assumed to only depend on total demand for the input.  The objective 
function is assumed to be 
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where m1 indicates marginal cost for the upstream monopolist. 
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and  
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Totally differentiating (3), and substituting (A18) and (A19) yields 
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and 
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It should be noticed that a lemma that ￿X/￿e=￿n/￿r in Ordover and Panzar, which holds in perfect 
competitive equilibrium, does not hold in case of Cournot equilibrium of the downstream sector. 
          Using  (3),  (A18)  and  (A19),  the  first-order  conditions  for  maximizing  the  objective 
function in (A17) simplify to 
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Inserting  four  equations (A20)-(A23)  into  (A24)  and  (A25),  the  following  relationships are 
obtained: 
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(A27) 
Substituting ￿L/￿r =0 into the second term on the right-hand side in (A26) yields 
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Thus, from (A28) and e(￿L/￿e)=0, e must be positive and the optimal access fee in Cournot 
equilibrium is given by e=y
2/(−D’).  This optimal solution for the access fee is equal to that 
obtained from (8) in Section 3.2. 
 
 
APPENDIX D: Derivation of the Partial Derivatives in Table 3 
          Since the unit congestion price must be zero in the states that the capacity constraint is not 
binding, firm supply is the function of the final product price and a change in the capacity of the 
facility does not affect endogenous variables in these states.  Total differentiation of (2) yields  
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Totally differentiating (3) and substituting (A29) and (A30) yields 
 





















 .                                                                                                      (A32) 
 
 
APPENDIX E: A Numerical Example of the Effects of Uncertainty on Vertically Related Markets 
with Congestion Pricing 
     Suppose that the demand function D(p, ￿) is linear and takes the following form: 
 
           D(p, ￿)  =  20  −  p  +  ￿    .                                                                                      (A33)  
 
A stochastic variable ￿ is supposed to be uniform and distribute on [0, 20].  Thus, the probability 
that ￿ occurs is given by 0.05.  Each downstream firm is supposed to require one unit of the input 
in question to produce one unit of output so that z=1.  The cost function of each downstream firm 
is linear and takes the following form: 
 
           Cd(y) = 5 + 10y
2  .                                                                                                    (A34)  
 
Then, the marginal cost is given by 20y and the firm supply function becomes   28
 
            y(p, r) = (p − r)/20  .                                                                                                (A35) 
 
Finally, the total cost of the upstream facility is supposed to be  
 
Cm = m0 + 1.25K                                                                                             (A36) 
 
Based on these functional forms in (A33)-(A36), the optimal values for expected 
unconstrained welfare maximization and upstream profit maximization are respectively obtained 
by simultaneously solving the equilibrium conditions and first order conditions.  For both cases, 
an equilibrium condition of zD=zny=X=K is imposed on the computation of the optimal solutions.  
A Gauss-Newton method is used to solve a simultaneous-equation system that consists of three 
reduced-form equations and three variables (e, n, and K).  
Table  4  compares  equilibrium  values  of  key  variables  between  expected 
unconstrained welfare maximization and upstream profit maximization.  Compared with the case 
of expected unconstrained welfare maximization where e=0, the profit maximizing upstream 
monopolist raises the  access  fee to  2.4,  thereby  reducing  the  number  of  downstream  firms 
approximately  by  57%.    The  profit-maximizing  monopolist  lowers  the  upstream  capacity 
approximately by 52% to increase revenue from congestion pricing.  As a result, the monopoly 
optimal price of congestion becomes four times as large as the welfare optimal price of congestion.   
The probability of congestion in the profit maximization case becomes double of that in the 
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Table 1. Effects of the access fee and capacity of the essential facility on key endogenous 
variables in perfectly competitive equilibrium (directions of changes are indicated by signs in 
parentheses) 
￿p/￿e  ￿r/￿e  ￿y/￿e  ￿n/￿e  ￿X/￿e 
0  −1/(zy)   
 (−) 
  −yr/(zy)    
 (+) 
nyr/(zy
2)   
 (−) 
   0 




2D’)   
(−) 
    0    1/(zy)   
  (+) 






























Table 2. Effects of the access fee and capacity of the essential facility on key endogenous 
variables in Cournot equilibrium (directions of changes are indicated by signs in parentheses) 
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Table  3.  Effects  of  the  access  fee  on  key  endogenous  variables  in  perfectly  competitive 
equilibrium, when the capacity constraint is not binding (directions of changes are indicated by 
signs in parentheses) 
 
￿p/￿e   ￿y/￿e  ￿n/￿e  ￿X/￿e 
1/y    
 (+) 





zD’/y    



































Table 4.  Computation results of key variables in a numerical example of Appendix E  
  E(y)  E(p)  E(r)  n  K  1−P0  e 
Welfare 
maximization 
0.70  15.2  1.25  21.1  16.9  0.35  0 
Upstream  Profit 
maximization 
0.86  22.2  5.06  9.1  8.1  0.71  2.4 
 
 